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PETITION FOR REHEARING
Pursuant to Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure,
Defendant and Appellant, Norman H. Rowe respectfully petitions the
Utah Court of Appeals for rehearing with respect to the Court ! s
decision in the above captioned matter entered November 19, 1993.
BACKGROUND
The case arises from the orders of Commissioner Maetani and
Judge Christensen of the Fourth District Court.

The orders

essentially adopted a stipulation of the parties dated September
10, 1989, in the order to show cause hearing held March 17, 1992.
The stipulation had been rejected by the Court in 1989 for failure
to comply with the applicable child support guideline statutes.
Without taking any further evidence to show compliance with the
applicable

statutes,

the

Fourth

District

Court

adopted

the

stipulation.
ISSUE ON REHEARING
Does a District

Court

Commissioner have to comply with

statutory requirements in ruling on a modification petition?
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Court misapprehends the failure of the Commissioner to
comply with the governing statutes pertaining to the modification
of an existing decree. The Court overlooks the facts in the record
indicating that Mrs. Rowe had in effect nothing upon which to bring
1

an order to show cause and that in law a stipulation of the parties
cannot bind the Trial Court and is only binding upon the parties
once it has been incorporated into an order of the Trial Court.
That this had not been done prior to the hearing that gave rise to
this action is not in doubt.

Therefore, the Commissioner had

before him a disputed petition to modify
decree,

not

the

enforcement

of

an

an existing

ancient

noncompliance with the applicable statutes.

divorce

stipulation

in

Lastly, neither the

findings in the Commissioner's Order nor Mrs. Rowe f s arguments
comply with the facts in the record - a matter which Mr. Rowe
submits this Court has overlooked.
ARGUMENT
I.
clearly

Compliance With Statute Required.

The Legislature has

said

has

that

when

the

Commissioner

before

him

a

modification request, he must obey the following:
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78-45-7.

Determination of amount of support
Rebuttable guidelines.

(1) Prospective support shall be equal to the amount
granted by prior Court Order unless there has been a material
change of circumstances on the part of the obligor or obligee.
(2) If no prior Court Order exists, or a material
change in circumstances has occurred,
the Court
determining the amount of prospective support shall
require each party to file a proposed award of child
support using the guidelines before an Order awarding
child support or modifying an existing award may be
granted.

2

(3) If the Court finds sufficient evidence to rebut
the guidelines, the Court shall establish support after
considering all relevant factors, including but not
limited to:
(a) the standard of living and situation
of the parties;
(b) the relative wealth and income of the
parties;
(c) the ability of the obligor to earn;
(d) the ability of the obligee to earn;
(e) the needs of
obligor, and the child;

the

obligee,

the

(f) the ages of the parties; and
(g) the responsibilities of the obligor
and the obligee for the support of others.
If the matter is uncontested, the Court then has to follow the
following:
Utah

Code Ann.

§ 78-45-7.3

Procedure -- Documentation Stipulation

(1) In a default or uncontested proceeding, the moving
party shall submit:
(a) a completed child support worksheet;
(b)
the
financial
verification
Subsection 78-45-7.5(5); and

required

by

(c) a written statement indicating whether or not
the amount of child support requested is consistent with
the guidelines.
(2)
(a) If the documentation of income required
under Subsection (1) is not available, a verified
representation of the defaulting party's income by the

3

moving party, based on the best evidence available, may
be submitted.
(b) The evidence shall be in affidavit form and may
only be offered after a copy has been provided to the
defaulting party in accordance with Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure or Title 63, Chapter 46b, the Administrative
Procedures Act, in an administrative proceeding.
(3) (a) In a stipulated proceeding, one of the moving
parties shall submit:
(i) a completed child support worksheet;
(ii)
the
financial
verification
Subsection 78-45-7.5(5); and

required

by

(iii) a written statement indicating whether or not
the amount of child support requested is consistent with
the guidelines.
(b) A hearing is not required, but the guidelines shall
be used to review the adequacy of a child support Order
negotiated by the parents.
(c) A stipulated amount for child support or combined
child support and alimony is adequate under the guidelines if
the stipulated child support amount or combined amount exceeds
the total child support award required by the guidelines.
When the stipulated amount exceeds the guidelines, it may be
awarded without a finding under Section 78-45-7.2.
Whether the matter is contested or uncontested, it is obvious
that the Legislature wanted some documentation under oath from the
parties to indicate that the guidelines had been substantially met.
That the Commissioner did not do this on the March 17 Order to Show
Cause hearing is not argued.
where it is admitted.)

(See page 10 of Appellee's Brief

With both parties agreeing to the non-

4

compliance and the record devoid of any compliance, how can this
Court sustain the actions taken by the Court below?
II.

The Stipulation of the Parties Not Binding on the Court.

The Stipulation heretofore submitted by the parties is not binding
upon the Court, and the Trial Court has complete discretion to set
it aside if it so chooses. See Kline vs. Kline, 544 P.2d 472 (Utah
1975); and as the Utah Supreme Court said in Clawson vs. Clawson,
675 P.2d 562 (Utah 1983), "Stipulations of the parties to an action
are only advisory to the Court and the Court is not bound by them."
In the instant case, the Stipulation was submitted to the
Court, together with a proposed Order (R Pg. 166, Paragraph 17:
Addendum #11, Paragraph 17).

However, the Court feeling that the

Stipulation did not meet the requirements of the Child Support
Guidelines Statutes of the State, requested further documentation
from both parties

(R Pg. 116, Paragraph 18:

Addendum #11,

Paragraph 18) . When they both failed to supply it, the Stipulation
was rejected and the case dismissed.
The record in this case is devoid of any child support
worksheets, financial verification or written statements indicating
that the child support in the Stipulation was consistent with the
Guidelines. Clearly, in signing the Order the Trial Court violated
this statute.
504

Further, the Commissioner failed to follow Rule 4-

of the Code of Judicial Administration which states:
5

(8) No orders, judgments, or decrees based upon
stipulation shall be signed or entered unless the
stipulation is in writing, signed by the attorneys of
record for the respective parties and filed with the
clerk or the stipulation was made on the record.
A careful review of the record indicates that the Stipulation
was neither signed by respective counsel, nor read into the record.
Thus, by adopting it, the Court violated this rule, and renders its
Order unenforceable.
In 1989, when the documentation was not forthcoming, the Court
quite correctly rejected both the Stipulation and the proposed
Order, and both documents were returned by the Court through its
clerk to the defendants attorney, who had mailed them to the Court
(R Pg. 165, Paragraph 20; R Pg. 87: Addendum #5).
Further, based upon the failure of either party to provide the
necessary documentation, the Court on its own motion, dismissed the
case on April 15, 1991 (R Pg. 96; Addendum #7).

Therefore, since

the Stipulation had been rejected by the Court, it was not a valid
document upon which Mrs. Rowe could bring an order to show cause
and not a document which the Court could adopt without complying
with the statute.
III.

Findings of the Order Not Supported by Facts:

(a) In Paragraph 2 of the Order, it states that the parties
entered into a Stipulation on September 10, 1989, prepared by
Norman Rowe!s attorney, and that the Stipulation was never filed
6

by his attorney. This finding in the Order is manifestly incorrect
since the documents and Affidavits filed with the Court on March
25, 1992, clearly indicate that the Stipulation was filed with the
Court, and was

rejected.

(See Affidavit

of Graham Dodd and

accompanying documents from the Clerk of the Court returning the
Stipulation

and

Order, Addendum

#!s

5

and

11).

That

the

Commissioner committed error, there can be no doubt; for in the
transcript of the hearing held on March 17, 1991, the Commissioner
concluded in ten (10) difference places that the Stipulation was
never filed.

(R Pgs. 492, 495, 496, 497, 498, 499, 501, and 502;

Addendum #10)

This could have been avoided had he read the file

before him and his own clerk's letter (R Pg. 87: Addendum #5).
IV.

Plaintiff & Appellee's Arguments Not Based Upon the

Record.
Plaintiff alleges that she sent the Stipulation to the Court
on September 26, 1989 along with a cover letter indicating that
she was not represented by counsel; however, the record does not
show the original of this letter, nor is this statement supported.
In fact, a copy of it does not show up in the record until March
17, 1992, 2 1/2 years later, submitted by plaintiff's attorney at
the Order to Show Cause Hearing held March 17, 1992 (R 103 and
109).

Contrary to this, the letter from the Commissioner's clerk

to defendant's attorney rejecting the Stipulation and Order was
7

mailed on January 18, 1990, indicating that he was the one who in
fact filed the documents (R Pg. 87) .

The foregoing shows the

confusion in the mind of the plaintiff in remembering the facts.
However, it is clear from the defendant's letter of September 10,
1990 that

the parties had

earlier discussed

the matter and

plaintiff knew that the Stipulation had not been accepted by the
Court

(R Pg. 191; Addendum, Exhibit 4) and in his affidavit,

defendant further states "he advised her (plaintiff) of the same"
(R Pg. 193, 17; Addendum, Exhibit 5).
was

not

being

paid

the

$900.00

In addition, the plaintiff

per month

required

by

the

Stipulation (see R Pgs. 173-189; Addendum, Exhibit 6) and defendant
told her this in early 1990 (R Pg. 191 Addendum, Exhibit 4) .
Further, the statements in plaintiff's letter pertaining to her
being not represented by counsel are not correct since plaintifffs
attorney did not withdraw until October 20, 1989, well after
September 26 of the same year (R Pg. 86; Addendum, Exhibit 7).

In

addition, contrary to plaintiff's statements of fact that she was
not notified, both the Court's Order to Show Cause (R Pg. 88;
Addendum, Exhibit

8) and its Order of Dismissal

(R Pg. 96;

Addendum, Exhibit 9) show that plaintiff was copied by the Court.
In addition, the defendant notified plaintiff himself (R Pg. 193
17; Addendum, Exhibit 5) .

Therefore, the record shows that the

8

plaintiff was well notified that the Stipulation had been rejected
by the Court,
The only part of the Trial Court's Order which is on all fours
with the facts in the record is that Mr. Rowe paid to Mrs. Rowe the
sum of $12,600.00 which represented two months child support at
$800.00 per month, and $11,000.00 to satisfy arrearages to obtain
a satisfaction of judgment from an administrative court of the
State.

But this exchange of money for the judgment release was

done on October 6, 1989, before the stipulation had been submitted
to the Trial Court, and at a time when both parties thought the
Court would accept it.

(See record page 136 for copy of receipt.)

By rejecting the stipulation submitted in 1989, the Court rejected
all

of

its parts--including

the

exchange

of money

for the

satisfaction of judgment upon which the Commissioner now claims to
rely. Besides which, Mrs. Rowe received full consideration for the
satisfaction.

There is nothing in the record to show otherwise,

or that she has been prejudiced or damaged by the exchange.

For

the Commissioner to conclude that the satisfaction of judgment in
exchange for the $11,000.00 was grounds for enforcement of the
Stipulation without taking additional evidence was simply error.
This Court should not condone that error by affirming the action.
Even if the Stipulation had been adopted by the Commissioner in
1989, Mr. Rowe would still have had the right to challenge it due
9

to material change of circumstances.

This is his right by law.

This has effectively been denied him by the Commissioner.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Rowe submits that the record in this case is clear. The
Commissioner had before him on March 17, 1991 a petition for
modification. The law in Utah is clear on the procedure and duties
of the Trial Court in adjudicating modifications. The Commissioner
did not follow the statutes and did not follow the rules of court.
In addition, by its prior acts, the Trial Court had rejected and
rendered void the Stipulation.

Neither the findings in the

Commissioner's order, nor the arguments of Mrs. Rowe are supported
by the record.
For the foregoing reasons, this Court

should prevent a

miscarriage of justice and strike its prior order affirming the
lower court's orders entered on the 19th day of November 1993 and
reverse the lower court's actions as being in contravention of the
applicable statutes and not in keeping with the facts of the case.
Respectfully submitted on the 3rd day of December, 1993.
KIRTON, McCONKIE & POELMAN

'Gfaham Dodd
Attorney for Norman H. Rowe
Defendant & Appellant
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CERTIFICATION
The undersigned certifies that the Petition for Rehearing is
presented in good faith and not for delay.
Dated on this the 3rd day of December, 1993.

^HSraham Dodd
Attorney for Petitioner
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